

## Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 07745

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, UK, FR, GW, WB, NATO

SUBJECT: 1975 SPRING QUADRIpartite MEETING

REF: STATE 110917

BEGIN SUMMARY: AS REQUESTED PARA 6 REFTel, WE TRANSMIT  
BELOW PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRIpartite BREAKFAST  
DISCUSSION AND FIRST DRAFT OF PAPER, KEYED TO AGENDA,  
WHICH MIGHT BE GIVEN MINISTERS BY WAY OF PREPARATION  
FOR BREAKFAST. WE STRESS THAT DRAFT HAS NO OFFICIAL  
STATUS; IT IS BASED ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL  
BONN GROUP MEMBERS FOR THE VARIOUS SECTIONS, ALL PREPARED  
SO FAR AS WE KNOW WITHOUT CLEARANCE FROM CAPITALS.  
PAPER IS BEING CIRCULATED TO BONN GROUP REPS TODAY  
(MAY 14) AND WILL BE DISCUSSED BY BONN GROUP MAY 15 AS  
PRELIMINARY TO REPORTING TO CAPITALS. COMMUNIQUE HAS  
BEEN DROPPED FROM AGENDA PENDING RECEIPT OF GUIDANCE AS  
TO HOW THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED IN CONTEXT OF SUMMIT-LEVEL  
NATO DECLARATION. END SUMMARY

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AGENDA

QUADRIPARTITE WORKING BREAKFAST  
PARIS, MAY BLANK, 1975

- I. THE LAST SIX MONTHS: TRENDS IN SOVIET BERLIN POLICY
- II. THE NEXT SIX MONTHS: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS
  - 1. BERLIN AND DETENTE
  - 2. INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND FRG RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (REMARKS BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER)
  - 3. MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIES
  - 4. FRG REPRESENTATION ABROAD OF WEST BERLIN INTERESTS
  - 5. BERLIN AND THE EC
- III. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE FOREGOING FOR THE ALLIES AND THE FRG
  - 1. ALLIED/FRG POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN CHALLENGES
  - 2. CONSULTATIONS? PROS AND CONS OF ACCEPTING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR "NON-FQP" FOUR POWER TALKS ON BERLIN

D AGENDA

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT PAPER

- I. THE LAST SIX MONTHS: TRENDS IN SOVIET BERLIN POLICY
- THE "BERLIN AND GERMAN" POLICY OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES, WITHOUT HAVING PROFOUNDLY CHANGED SINCE DECEMBER 1974, HAS BECOME MORE VIGOROUS. THE USSR CONTINUES TO SEEK TO HAVE A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT PREVAIL. THE PROVISION OF THE QA ACCORDING TO WHICH "THE WESTERN SECTORS CONTINUE NOT TO BE A CONSTITUENT PART OF THE FRG AND NOT TO BE GOVERNED BY IT" CONSTITUTES ACCORDING TO SOVIET POLICY, THE CENTER OF THE SYSTEM CREATED BY THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, TO WHICH ALL OTHER CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBORDINATED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE "TIES" PROVISION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT IS EITHER IGNORED OR DEVALUED. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION B OF PART II OF THE AGREEMENT ("PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN") THUS CONSTITUTES ABOVE

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ALL ELSE THE AREA OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SOVIET ATTACKS AND REMAINS THE QUESTION WHICH CAN, IN THE FUTURE, CREATE THE MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE USSR. NO DIFFICULTIES SIMILAR TO THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE LAST QUADRIPARTITE DINNER, BUT THE VIGILANCE OF THE SOVIETS IN THE YB#E.G., LEX BRUECKMANN, LORENZ AFFAIR) IS WORTHY OF NOTE. THE USSR IS ALSO CLAIMING

A CONCURRING VOICE IN ALL AFFAIRS REGARDING WEST BERLIN.  
THE SOVIETS PUSH WHEN TALKING WITH ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES  
THE DESIRABILITY OF CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WESTERN  
DECISIONS REGARDING BERLIN, AND IN CONTACTS WITH FRG  
REPRESENTATIVES ASSERT A RIGHT UNDER THE QUADRIPARTITE  
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH DECISIONS.

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED.

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THE INTERPRETATION OF THE RESERVATIONS TOUCHING ON  
"MATTERS OF SECURITY AND STATUS'.HAS BEEN AT THE CENTER  
OF THE DISPUTES TIED TO THE REPRESENTATION ABROAD OF  
THE WESTERN SECTORS. BUT THE SOVIET AND EASTERN  
EUROPEAN ATTACKS HAVE, DURING THE LAST MONTHS, TAKEN ON  
NEW DIMENSIONS: REGARDING THE EXTENSION TO WEST BERLIN  
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE FRG,  
THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT TO HAVE THE ALLIES ACCEPT

CONDITIONS NOT CONTAINED IN THE QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT; THE EASTERN STATES, AND PARTICULARLY THE GDR, HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A BROAD CONCEPT OF "MATTERS OF SECURITY AND STATUS"; THE SOVIETS HAVE OPENED, WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONS OF BERLIN WITH THE EC, AN IMPORTANT DISPUTE; AND FINALLY, THE USSR HAS MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE AND TO CARRY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RIVALRIES WHICH HAVE UNTIL NOW BEEN "QUADRIpartite."

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THE INCREASED VIGOR OF THE SOVIET ATTACKS CONFIRMS THAT MOSCOW HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS AIM OF TRANSFORMING BERLIN INTO AN "INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY." THE SOVIETS SO FAR HAVE STOPPED SHORT OF SEEKING TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL DIRECTLY, AND ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IT INDIRECTLY BY HAVING A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT PREVAIL. TO THIS END THEY HAVE EXPLOITED THE POSSIBILITY WHICH THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE "BERLIN AND GERMAN FRONT" OFFERS THEM; THAT IS, THE INTERNATIONAL FORA, THE RELATIONS OF THE GDR WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, AND THE BILATERAL FRG-GDR AND FRG-USSR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN SIDE ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE THE FRG INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS IN PRINCIPLE WHEREVER BONN HAS A REAL INTEREST IN BRINGING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLETION.

## II. THE NEXT SIX MONTHS: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

### 1. BERLIN AND DETENTE

BERLIN REMAINS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, BERLIN IS A BENEFICIARY OF DETENTE: THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT PROVOKED ANY MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS OVER THE CITY IS LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE EFFECTS FOR THE CITY OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE, AND PARTICULARLY, TO THE INTERIM SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS, NEVERTHELESS, NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE USSR ATTITUDE WILL BE MODIFIED AFTER THE END OF THE CSCE. CERTAIN CLUES (E.G., INCREASED SOVIET EFFORTS TO CREATE "QUADRIpartISM FOR WEST BERLIN," ATTACKS IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS AGAINST THE BERLIN AND GERMAN POLICY OF THE FRG, THE VEHEMENCE IN THE TONE OF CERTAIN SOVIET PROTESTS, AND ENLARGEMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL FORA OF THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE ACTIONS AND PROTESTS) LEAD TO THE THOUGHT THAT SUCH AN EVOLUTION CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. IT MUST BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BROADER SOVIET INTERESTS IN PURSUING DETENTE MAY BE EXPECTED TO AMELIORATE OR EVEN OBIVIATE ANY BASIC SOVIET SHIFT WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD.

ANY POLICY ALTERATION WOULD PROBABLY BE  
MANIFESTED, INTER ALIA, BY USSR OPPOSITION TO FRG  
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INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF THE MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOP-  
MENT OF TIES. THE FORM OF SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD IN-  
CLUDE AN EASTERN HARDENING IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE  
FRG AND THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE PURSUIT OF OPEN  
CONFRONTATION IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, BLOCKAGE OF THE  
ACCESS ROUTES, ETC.; ONE OF THE RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES IN  
THIS PROCESS COULD BE TO INDUCE OR OBLIGE THE THREE  
POWERS TO INVOKE THE CONSULTATION CLAUSE OF THE FQP,  
THUS PUTTING THEM IN THE POSITION OF DEMANDEURS.

2. INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND FRG RELATIONS WITH  
OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

REMARKS BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.

3. MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIES  
AS AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUED  
VIABILITY OF THE CITY, IT IS THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL  
REPUBLIC TO FURTHER BERLIN'S TIES TO THE FEDERATION,  
ABOVE ALL WITH RESPECT TO INCLUSION OF THE CITY IN ITS  
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM. THE TIES ARE  
ALSO OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION OF THE CITY. IN THE REALIZATION  
OF THIS OBJECTIVE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE GUIDED  
NOT ONLY BY LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS BUT ALSO BY

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CONSIDERATIONS OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNENESS. AS IN THE PAST, THESE CONSIDERATIONS WILL BE WEIGHED IN APPROPRIATE ALLIED-FRG CONSULTATIONS.

4. FRG REPRESENTATION ABROAD OF WEST BERLIN INTERESTS

THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES WILL PROBABLY NOT SLACKEN THEIR PRESSURE IN THIS FIELD, WHETHER TO INDICATE THEIR LEGAL POSITION WHEN THEY CANNOT INTERVENE DIRECTLY OR TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE FRG WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO INDUCE BONN TO CONCEDE ITS OWN LEGAL POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE ALLIES AND THE FRG MUST IN THE FUTURE, AS IN THE PAST, STICK TO THE TERMS OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. THE THREE POWERS MUST CONTINUE FIRMLY TO REJECT ANY USSR PROTESTS ALLEGING NON-RESPECT OF "CONDITIONS" WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN SET OUT IN QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS. LIKEWISE, THEY MUST AVOID PERMITTING THE CREATION OF A NEW BROADER CONCEPT OF "MATTERS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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SECURITY AND STATUS." THEY MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO INSURE THAT TREATIES ARE NOT EXTENDED TO BERLIN WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THE FRG FOR ITS PART, SHOULD DEFEND, WITH ALLIED SUPPORT IF DESIRED, ITS RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN SECTORS AND SHOULD OPPOSE THE CLAIMS OF THE GDR TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH THE SENAT ON MATTERS ALLEGED BY EAST BERLIN TO AFFECT "SECURITY AND STATUS."

5. BERLIN AND THE EC

RUSSIAN AND EAST GERMAN PROTESTS IN THE PAST (E.G., PATENT OFFICE) AGAINST THE APPLICATION IN

BERLIN OF CONSTITUTIVE TREATIES OF THE EC AND NOW AGAINST LOCATION IN BERLIN OF THE EUROPEAN CENTER FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING CONSTITUTE ADVANCE SIGNS OF DIFFICULTIES WHICH COULD CROP UP IN THE NEXT MONTHS WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES (E.G., APPLICATION IN BERLIN OF CERTAIN AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE EC AND REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS; EUROPEAN PASSPORT UNION; ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE; AND EVENTUAL FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN CERTAIN COMMUNITY POLICIES). THE AIM OF THE ALLIES SHOULD BE TWO-FOLD. ON THE ONE HAND, BERLIN AND ITS INHABITANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS IMPLIES IN PARTICULAR THAT BERLIN WOULD BE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ASSOCIATED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY AND THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY WEAKENING OF BERLIN'S POSITION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ALLIES MUST AVOID BEING CONFRONTED BY COMMUNITY "FAIT ACCOMPLIS" WHICH COULD WEAKEN THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIETS AND/OR OBLIGE THEM TO PROHIBIT THE APPLICATION TO BERLIN OF DECISIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH BERLIN LEGISLATION. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE IN A POSITION TO STUDY IN ADVANCE PROPOSALS FOR DECISIONS OR REGULATIONS WHOSE APPLICATION MIGHT CREATE PROBLEMS AND, WHERE NECESSARY, BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE INDIRECTLY IN THE PROCESS OF ELABORATING THESE PROPOSALS.

AS REGARDS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE ALLIES AND  
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THE FRG, THE ABOVE DOES NOT IMPLY A NEED TO DEFINE ENTIRELY NEW PROCEDURES, BUT ONLY THAT THE EXISTING ONES SHOULD BE APPLIED OR IMPROVED SO THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE IN ADVANCE BY CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION THESE PROBLEMS WHICH IT WOULD NEITHER BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC NOR OF THE THREE POWERS TO HAVE TO RESOLVE POST FACTO. IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRG TO RAISE FOR CONSULTATION IN A TIMELY WAY EC MEASURES WHICH MIGHT HAVE SENSITIVE BERLIN ASPECTS.

### III. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE FOREGOING FOR THE ALLIES AND THE FRG

#### 1. ALLIED/FRG POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN CHALLENGES

THE ALLIED PRACTICE OF RESPONDING SYSTEMATICALLY TO ALL THE DEMARCHES AND PROTESTS MADE BY THE RUSSIANS OR THEIR ALLIES IS NOT WITHOUT CERTAIN PROBLEMS:

##### A. IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, AN EFFECT OF THIS

PRACTICE CAN BE TO KEEP UP A DISPUTE IN WHICH WE RISK  
TO LOSE MORE THAN OUR ADVERSARIES;

B. IN THE CASE OF BILATERAL PROTESTS, WE MAY,  
IN MULTIPLYING THE EXPLANATIONS AND ARGUMENTS, RECOGNIZE  
A RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIANS FOR A CERTAIN SUPER-  
VISORY ROLE OVER THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN. WE ARE,

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MOREOVER, ALWAYS PUT IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION, WHICH MAY  
BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY DIVERGENCIES OF VIEWS AMONG  
THE FOUR WESTERN ALLIES WHICH PRECLUDE AGREEMENT ON A  
REPLY.

THE ALLIES COULD, THEREFORE, IN THE FUTURE ADOPT  
THE FOLLOWING POLICY:

A. WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL FORA, RESPOND TO  
ALL RUSSIAN DEMARCHES, BUT IN PRINCIPLE NOT TO NOTES  
FROM THIRD STATES THAT HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT VIEWS  
WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN MATTERS.



B. IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

WE MIGHT CONSIDER:

- A) REPLYING MORE SELECTIVELY TO RUSSIAN PROTESTS;
- B) LIMITING, EACH TIME THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE, OUR REPLIES TO REFERENCES OR TO QUOTATIONS FROM PREVIOUS ALLIED NOTES;
- C) MAKE USE OF THE ESTABLISHED CHANNELS IN CONFIDENTIAL

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BERLIN IN ORDER TO REPLY IMMEDIATELY, ORALLY, AND IN DEPTH TO RUSSIAN DEMARCHES.

C. WE COULD EQUALLY CONSIDER TAKING THE INITIATIVE BY DEMARCHES VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS WHERE THEIR POLICY AND/OR ACTIONS (OR THOSE OF THE GDR) SEEM TO US TO CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT VIOLATION OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS, DECISIONS OR PRACTICES CONCERNING BERLIN.

2. CONSULTATIONS? PROS AND CONS OF ACCEPTING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR "NON-FQP" FOUR POWER TALKS ON BERLIN

THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIETS MAY AT SOME POINT SUGGEST INFORMAL QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN. SUCH A SUGGESTION COULD BE TIED TO A SPECIFIC INCIDENT OR EVENT WHICH RESULTED IN DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE QA OR COULD COME AFTER A SERIES OF MORE GENERALIZED PROBLEMS AND BE CHARACTERIZED AS A DESIRE TO DEFINE AMBIGUITIES IN THE QA AND THUS AVOID BERLIN PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO INVOKE THE CONSULTATIONS CLAUSE OF THE FQP, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO ENTER INTO TALKS.

ARGUMENTS FOR RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR NON-FQP, INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. SHOULD TENSIONS BEGIN TO BUILD IN CONNECTION WITH SOME FUTURE EVENT, AS OCCURRED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEA, CONSULTATIONS MIGHT SERVE TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION, AND MIGHT ALSO "FREEZE" IT TO THE WESTERN ADVANTAGE;
- 2. IF IT APPEARS THAT FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS ARE INEVITABLE, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO KEEP THEM INFORMAL RATHER THAN WAITING FOR THE SOVIETS TO DEMAND FORMAL ONES UNDER THE FQP;
- 3. SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD SERVE TO IMPROVE COORDINATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE.

ARGUING AGAINST RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO ANY SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR NON-FQP TALKS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. DESPITE SOVIET CHARGES THAT IT IS THE FRG WHICH IS VIOLATING THE QA, IMPLICIT IN THIS IS AN ALLE-

GATION THAT THE ALLIES THEMSELVES HAVE VIOLATED THE QA  
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BY PERMITTING "IMPROPER" ACTIONS. AGREEING TO FORMAL  
CONSULTATIONS COULD THUS HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE OF PER-  
MITTING MOSCOW TO CLAIM THAT THE WEST HAD ADMITTED

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MISCONDUCT.

2. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT INFORMAL CONSULTA-  
TIONS COULD RESOLVE ANY OF THE DISPUTED POINTS THAT WERE  
LEFT IMPRECISE DURING THE PROLONGED QA NEGOTIATIONS  
THEMSELVES, OR THAT THE WEST COULD OBTAIN COUNTER-  
BALANCING CONCESSIONS FOR ANY MORE PRECISE DEFINITION

OF DISPUTED TERMS SUCH AS "EXISTING SITUATION" AND  
"DEVELOPMENT OF TIES." RESULTS WOULD THUS SEEM TO BE  
EROSION OF THE WESTERN POSITION OR "FAILURE OF THE TALKS  
AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH SPOTLIGHTING EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES  
ON BERLIN BRINGS.

3. MOSCOW WOULD NOT ENTER INTO TALKS CONCERNING  
BERLIN AS A WHOLE; RATHER, IT WOULD SEE WESTERN AGREE-  
MENT TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS AS CONFIRMATION OF ITS  
CLAIM TO A RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED ON MATTERS AFFECTING  
WEST BERLIN.

THE FRENCH DELEGATION, WITHOUT FAILING TO RECOGNIZE  
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THE RISKS OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, BELIEVES THAT THE  
ALLIED RESPONSE TO ANY EVENTUAL SOVIET OVERTURES SHOULD  
DEPEND ON THE SITUATION AT THE TIME, AND THE ANALYSIS  
THAT ONE MAKES OF IT. THIS DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT SUCH  
CONSULTATIONS COULD, IN CERTAIN CASES, BE THE LESS  
UNDESIRABLE OF ALL THE AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS AND WOULD  
PERMIT THE ALLIES TO AVOID, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, FORMAL  
CONSULTATIONS AND COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PREVENTING  
POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INITIATIVES TO "RAISE THE STAKES".

THE OTHER THREE DELEGATIONS, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING  
THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PLAY A ROLE, GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO  
THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE NON-FQP CONSULTATIONS,  
BELIEVING THAT IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE ANY CIR-  
CUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD CLEARLY  
BENEFIT FROM SUCH TALKS. THESE THREE DELEGATIONS,  
THEREFORE, ARE OF THE VIEW THAT SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR  
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN SHOULD, IN PRINCIPLE,  
BE TURNED ASIDE. END TEXT.

HILLENBRAND

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**Secure:** OPEN  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, US, UK, FR, GE, WB, NATO  
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